We give a categorical account of Arrow's theorem, a seminal result in social choice theory.
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The social decision on the relative preference between two alternatives a, b depends only on the individual preferences between these alternatives. It is independent of their rankings with respect to other alternatives.
• The Pareto or Uniformity Principle (P). If every individual prefers a to b, then so should the social welfare function.
We can now state Arrow's Theorem more formally as follows.
Theorem 1.1 (Arrow's Theorem) If |A| > 2 and I is finite, then any social welfare function satisfying IIA and P is a dictatorship: i.e. for some individual i ∈ I, for all profiles p ∈ P(A) I and alternatives a, b ∈ A: a σ(p) b ⇐⇒ a p i b.
Thus the social choice function, under these very plausible assumptions, simply copies the choices of one fixed individual -the dictator.
An extraordinary number of different proofs, as well as innumerable variations, have appeared in the (huge) literature. For a small selection, see [Arr63, Bla72, KS72, Tay05] .
A closely related result is the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [Gib73, Sat75] on voting systems:
Theorem 1.2 If |A| > 2 and I is finite, then any voting system v : P(A)
I −→ A which is non-manipulable is a dictatorship.
The following quotation from the recent text [Tay05] nicely captures the significance of the result:
"For an area of study to become a recognized field, or even a recognized subfield, two things are required: It must be seen to have coherence, and it must be seen to have depth. The former often comes gradually, but the latter can arise in a single flash of brilliance. . . . With social choice theory, there is little doubt as to the seminal result that made it a recognized field of study: Arrow's impossibility theorem."
The further contents of the paper are as follows. In Section 2, we shall present a fairly standard account of Arrow's theorem which will fix notation and serve as a reference point. In Section 3, we will reformulate Arrow's Theorem in categorical terms, and in Section 4, we shall give a development of the proof which uses the categorical formulation to emphasize the structural aspects. Section 5 concludes.
A 'standard' account of Arrow's theorem
The aim of this section is to give a clear, explicit presentation of a fairly standard account of Arrow's theorem and some related notions.
The arguments in Section 2.1 follow [Arr63] , with some clarifications and refinements due to [Bla72] . In Section 2.2, we follow [KS72] .
Preference Relations
We consider a number of properties of binary relations R ⊆ A 2 on a set A. These are all universally quantified over elements a, b, c ∈ A:
Reflexivity aRa
Irreflexivity ¬aRa
Symmetry aRb ⇒ bRa
A weak preference relation is a transitive connected relation. We write P(A) for the set of all weak preference relations on A. Given a weak preference relation R, we can define two other relations:
Strict Preference aP b := aRb ∧ ¬bRa.
Indifference aIb := aRb ∧ bRa.
Then P is a strict ordering (transitive and irreflexive), while I is an equivalence relation (reflexive, symmetric and transitive). These relations satisfy the following properties:
A weak preference relation is linear if it additionally satisfies antisymmetry. We write L(A) for the set of linear preference relations on A. If R is linear, then the associated indifference relation I is just the identity relation, while P is a strict linear order.
Given A ⊆ B, we can define a restriction map P(B) → P(A) :: R → R|A, where R|A := R ∩ A 2 . Note that the truth of any property of R expressed by a universal sentence is preserved under restriction, so this is well-defined; moreover, the same operation also defines a map L(B) → L(A).
Social choice situations
We shall define a class of structures which provide the setting for Arrow's theorem.
A social choice situation is a structure (A, I, D, σ) where:
• A is a set of alternatives.
• I is a set of individuals or agents.
• D ⊆ P(A) I is the set of allowed ballots or profiles of individual preferences.
• σ : D → P(A) is the social choice function.
We write p i for the weak preference relation of the individual i in a profile p. We write p > i for the strict preference relation associated with p i . Similarly, we write σ(p) > for the strict preference relation associated with σ(p). We extend restriction to profiles pointwise: (p|A) i := p i |A.
We shall now define a number of properties of social choice situations.
UD Unrestricted domain:
IIA Independence of irrelevant alternatives:
We can now state Arrow's theorem. 
Proof of Arrow's Theorem
In this section we shall fix a social choice situation (A, I, D, σ) satisfying the following conditions: |A| ≥ 3, UD, and IIA.
Decisiveness, Neutrality and Monotonicity
In this subsection, we shall assume that our social choice situation satisfies the weak Pareto principle WP. Given U ⊆ I and p ∈ D, we introduce the notation ap
Given a set U ⊆ I and distinct elements a, b ∈ A, we define
We define a relation D U on A by
We read aD U b as "U is decisive for a over b".
Proposition 2.2 For all a, b, c ∈ A:
For (1), if b = c there is nothing to prove. If b = c, we consider a profile p ∈ D such that for all i ∈ U , p i restricts to the strict chain abc, and for all i ∈ U c , p i restricts to the strict chain bca. Such a profile exists by UD. Note that p ∈ U ab ∩ U ac ∩ I bc . Since aD U b, aσ(p) > b, while by WP, bσ(p)c. By transitivity if bσ(p) > c, or by absorption otherwise, aσ(p) > c. Now consider any profile q such that q ∈ U ac . Then q|{a, c} = p|{a, c}, and by IIA, aσ(p) > c ⇒ aσ(q) > c; thus aD U c. The argument for (2) is similar.
As pointed out in [Bla72] , the following purely relational argument allows us to conclude Neutrality from the previous proposition.
Proposition 2.3 Let R be an irreflexive relation on a set X with at least three elements, such that, for all a, b, x ∈ X:
If x, y are any pair of distinct elements of X, then aRb ⇒ xRy.
Otherwise, x = b and y = a, and we must prove aRb ⇒ bRa. In this case, since X has at least three elements, we can find c ∈ X with a = c = b. Then:
As an immediate consequence of Propositions 2.2 and 2.3, we obtain Theorem 2.4 (Local Neutrality) For all a, b, x, y ∈ A with x = y:
We now define a relation E U on A by:
Thus we ask only that the individuals in U strictly prefer a to b; there is no constraint on those outside U . Clearly, aE U b ⇒ aD U b. The converse is an important property known as monotonicity.
Proof
We shall prove aD U b ⇒ aE U b. Suppose we are given a profile p such that ap > U b. We can find an element c ∈ A with a = c = b. We consider a profile q ∈ D such that for all i ∈ U , q i restricts to the strict chain acb, and for all i ∈ U c , c is strictly preferred to both a and b in q i , while q i |{a, b} = p i |{a, b}. Such a profile exists by UD. Note that q ∈ U ac ∩ I cb , and q|{a, b} = p|{a, b}. Since aD U b, by Proposition 2.2 aD U c, and so aσ(q) > c. By WP, cσ(q)b. By transitivity if cσ(q) > b, or by absorption otherwise, aσ(q) > b. Since p|{a, b} = q|{a, b}, by IIA we conclude that aσ(p) > b, and hence aE U b as required.
The Ultrafilter of Decisive Sets
In this subsection, we assume the strong Pareto principle P, which serves as a basic existence principle for decisive sets. Note indeed that P is equivalent to the statement that I is a decisive set.
We define U := {U ⊆ I | ∃a, b ∈ A. aD U b}.
Theorem 2.6 (The Ultrafilter Theorem) U is an ultrafilter.
Proof (F1) As we have already noted, P implies that I ∈ U . (F2) Now suppose that U ∈ U and U ⊆ V . By Proposition 2.5, we can conclude that
(F3) Now suppose for a contradiction that U and V are both in U , where U ∩ V = ∅. Consider a profile p ∈ D such that ap (F4) Finally suppose that U ∈ U can be written as a disjoint union U = V ⊔ W . We shall show that either V ∈ U or W ∈ U . Consider a profile p ∈ D such that for each i ∈ V , p i restricts to the strict chain bca, for each i ∈ W , p i restricts to the strict chain cab, while for each i ∈ U c , p i restricts to the strict chain abc. Such a profile exists by UD. Note that p ∈ U ca ∩ V ba ∩ W cb . We argue by cases:
• If cσ(p) > b, then by IIA, for all q ∈ W cb , cσ(q) > b, and hence cD W b, and W ∈ U .
• Otherwise, we must have bσ(p)c. Since p ∈ U ca and U ∈ U , using the Neutrality Theorem 2.4, we must have cσ(p) > a. By absorption, bσ(p) > a. By IIA, for all q ∈ V ba , bσ(q) > a, and hence bD V a, and V ∈ U .
The conditions (F1)-(F4) are easily seen to be equivalent to the standard definition of an ultrafilter, given as (F1) and (F2) together with:
We define the set of ballots which are linear on the alternatives a, b:
We now show that U completely determines σ on linear ballots.
The right-to-left implication is immediate, since if U = {i ∈ I | ap > i b}, p ∈ L ab implies that p ∈ U ab . For the converse, we use property (F7) from Theorem 2.6.
We also show that social choice functions map linear ballots to strict preferences. 
Proof Immediate from the previous proposition and property (F7) from Theorem 2.6.
Arrow's Theorem
Theorem 2.9 (Arrow) Let (A, I, D, σ) be a social choice situation with |A| ≥ 3, satisfying UD, IIA and P. Then if I is finite it also satisfies D, i.e. there is a dictator. Proof By the Ultrafilter Theorem 2.6, U is an ultrafilter. Since I is finite, U must be principal, consisting of all supersets of {i} for some i ∈ I. Then D {i} is decisive, or equivalently by Proposition 2.5, i is a dictator.
Categorical Formulation of Arrow's Theorem
Given a universe A of possible alternatives, where the cardinality of A is ≥ 3, we consider the category C whose objects are subsets of A, and whose morphism are injective maps; and its posetal sub-category C inc with morphisms the inclusions. We shall use C (k) and C (k) inc to denote the full sub-categories of C and C inc respectively determined by the sets A of cardinality ≤ k, for k ≥ 0. We write C op for the opposite category of C.
For any notion of binary preference relation axiomatized by universal sentences (universal closures of quantifier-free formulas), we get a functor
P(X) is the set of preference relations on X, and if f : X > > Y and p ∈ P(Y ), then we define
Note that injectivity ensures that (X, P(f )(p)) is isomorphic to a sub-structure of (Y, p), and hence the truth of universal sentences is preserved [Hod97] . Also note that P cuts down to a functor P inc : C op inc −→ Set. We shall use P to denote the functor induced by the notion of weak preference relation introduced in the previous section, and L for the subfunctor of linear preference relations.
Categorical formulation of UD
The functor P I inc is defined as the product of I copies of P inc ; thus for each A, P I inc (A) := P inc (A) I . This gives the set of all possible profiles over a set of alternatives A for the agents in I. We shall assume we are given a subfunctor D of P I . Thus D : C op −→ Set is a functor, with a natural transformation D . ✲ P I whose components are inclusion maps. D restricts to a functor D inc : C op inc −→ Set. The axiom UD can be stated in these terms as follows:
The requirement that D inc preserves epis means that inclusions ι :
Categorical formulation of IIA
Next, we make the observation that IIA is equivalent to the following statement:
(CIIA) The social welfare function is a natural transformation
Explicitly, this says that for each set of alternatives A we have a map
such that, for all inclusions A ⊆ B and profiles p ∈ D inc (A):
More precisely, we have the following result.
Proposition 3.1 We assume that D inc is a subfunctor of P I inc satisfying CUD.
If σ
is a function satisfying IIA, then it extends to a natural
✲ P inc is a natural transformation, then for every A ∈ C, σ A satisfies IIA. Proof 1. Firstly, note that (A, I, D inc (A), σ A ) is a social choice situation in the sense of the previous section. We are assuming that this structure satisfies IIA.
We note that IIA implies the following, more general statement: for all A ⊆ A, and
This holds because any binary relation on a set X is determined by its restrictions to the subsets of X of cardinality ≤ 2. Given A ⊆ A and p ∈ D inc (A), by CUD there is q ∈ D inc (A) such that q|A = p. We define σ A (p) := σ A (q)|A. By our previous remark, this is independent of the choice of q. For naturality, if ι : A ⊂ ✲ B and p ∈ D inc (B), then for any q ∈ D inc (A) such that q|B = p, q|A = D inc (ι)(q|B), and hence
For the converse, if
✲ P inc is a natural transformation, A ⊆ A, and ι :
Categorical formulation of P
Consider the standard diagonal map ∆ I : X −→ X I . An arrow f : X I → X is diagonalpreserving if f • ∆ I = id X . The Pareto condition is essentially a form of diagonal preservation.
Firstly, note that given a functor F : C op inc −→ Set, we can define the restriction
inc . The categorical formulation of the Pareto condition is now as follows: 
Diagrammatically, this is
L inc ({a, b}) ∆ I ✲ D inc ({a, b}) P inc ({a, b}) σ {a,b} ❄ ⊂ ✲ Proposition 3.2 Let D inc
Categorical Formulation of Arrow's Theorem
A categorical social choice situation is given by a set A determining a category C, a set I of individuals, a subfunctor D inc of P I inc satisfying CUD, and a natural transformation σ : 
An Analogous Result in Type Theory
We remark that when Arrow's theorem is formulated in this way, it displays an evident kinship with a well-studied genre of results in functional programming and type theory [Wad89, BFSS90] . These results use (di)naturality constraints to show that the behaviour of polymorphic terms are essentially determined by their types.
We illustrate these ideas with an example.
Question What natural transformations
✲ X can there be in the functor category [Set, Set]?
Answer The only such natural transformations are the projections.
Sketch Use naturality to show this first for two-element sets, then to lift it. E.g.
Exercise Show that the same result holds for natural transformations X I . ✲ X.
Categorical perspective on the proof of Arrow's Theorem
We shall now revisit the proof of Arrow's theorem from the categorical perspective. We shall assume throughout this section that we are given a categorical social choice situation (A, I, D, σ) satisfying CP. Note firstly that, for each A ⊆ A, (A, I, D(A), σ A ) is a standard social choice situation satisfying UD, IIA and P. We shall use results from Section 2 freely.
Neutrality as Naturality
The property of Neutrality, which in the concrete setting was stated in a 'local' form in Theorem 2.4, becomes a form of naturality. To state this properly, we need to consider the subfunctor
The key neutrality property becomes the following:
The assertion of this proposition is that a social welfare function is natural with respect, not just to inclusions, but to injective maps. Note that the family of maps {σ L A } is the same: we are claiming that additional naturality squares commute.
Proof
Let α : A > > B be an injective map. We must show that f = g, where
Note that, for r ∈ L(B) and a, a ′ ∈ A,
For p ∈ D L (B), and distinct a, a ′ ∈ A, by Proposition 2.7:
The Factorization Theorem
We now recast the Ultrafilter Theorem into an arrow-theoretic form. Firstly, we recall some standard notions from boolean algebra [Sik69] . We can define maps
The following is a restatement in arrow-theoretic terms of the Ultrafilter Theorem. 
The content of this result is that all the information needed to compute the social welfare function σ is contained in the boolean algebra homomomorphism h.
The categorical form of Arrow's theorem, Theorem 3.3, follows immediately from the Factorization Theorem and the last remark in Proposition 4.2.
Discussion
One of our motivations in undertaking this study of Arrow's theorem was to see if common structure could be identified with notions such as no-signalling, parameter independence etc. which play a key rôle in quantum foundations. Arrow's theorem is a no-go theorem of a similar flavour to results such as Bell's theorem. A central assumption is IIA, which is analogous to the various forms of independence which appear as hypotheses of the results in quantum foundations. In particular, the functorial treatment we have developed in the present paper has common features with the rôle of presheaves in the sheaf-theoretic account of quantum non-locality and contextuality given in [AB11] .
It must be said that, although some degree of commonality has been exposed by the present account, the arguments are substantially different. Nevertheless, the use of the categorical language to put results from such different settings in a common framework is suggestive, and may prove fruitful in exploring the rôle of various forms of independence. It will also be interesting to relate this to the logics of dependence and independence being developed by Jouko Väänänen and his colleagues.
Altogether, although modest in its scope, we hope the present paper may help to suggest some further possibilities for elucidating the general structure of no-go results, and of the notions of independence which play a pervasive part in these results.
